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1. Introduction
Ever since Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI) has entered the epis-
temological scene, a vigorous discussion has evolved as to whether it
is superior to one of its main rivals, Epistemic Contextualism (EC).
The participants in this discussion have presented a variety of ar-
guments utilising issues concerning topics as diverse as scepticism,
closure, the lottery paradox and the normativity of assertion, but have
also focused on more linguistic issues such as the felicitousness of cer-
tain ‘knowledge’-ascriptions and the syntactic properties of the pred-
icate ‘know’.1 This paper argues that one topic is to be added to
this list of issues that can help making an informed decision between
EC and SSI, viz. the topic of modal and temporal embeddings of
knowledge-ascriptions.
Even though the discussion of such embeddings has been initiated
by Stanley (2005) the topic hasn’t received much further attention in
the literature yet, which is perhaps due to the fact that Stanley makes
a fairly convincing case for the view that EC and SSI are explanatorily
on a par with regard to the relevant data.2 To be more precise, Stanley
∗ Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. I am indebted to
Dorothy Edgington, John Hawthorne, Jason Stanley, Timothy Williamson, the audi-
ence at the Ockham Society in Oxford and an anonymous referee of PPR for helpful
comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1 See Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005) and Blome-Tillmann (forthcoming).
2 See also Hawthorne (2004, p. 177, fn. 40).
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argues for the view that both theories, EC and SSI, can account for
the data concerning temporal embeddings, while both struggle with
the data generated by modal ones. Stanley’s view can accordingly be
depicted by means of the following scorecard, where the ticks symbolise
compatibility and the crosses incompatibility with the data in question:
Table I. Stanley’s Scorecard
temporal modal
embeddings embeddings
EC
√ ×
SSI
√ ×
In this paper I call into question the view that EC ties with SSI
concerning modal and temporal embeddings. To my mind, the contex-
tualist has, in the discussed field, a clear advantage over the subject-
sensitive invariantist, which will become particularly obvious once we
consider a new type of linguistic datum, viz. what I call “conjunctive
‘knowledge’-ascriptions”. Conjunctive ‘knowledge’-ascriptions, the pa-
per argues, generate data that do not only conflict with SSI but are
rather also suited to shed light on why SSI is troubled by modal and
temporal embeddings. Summing up my agenda, the scorecard envisaged
in this paper is the following:
Table II. Envisaged Scorecard
temporal modal conjunctive
embeddings embeddings ascriptions
EC
√ √ √
SSI × × ×
Once a case has been made for the view depicted by my alternative
scorecard, we have fresh reasons to doubt the accuracy of SSI more
generally, i.e. we have fresh reasons to doubt the accuracy of the view
that knowledge is sensitive to the subject’s context as it has most
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prominently been defended by John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley in
the recent literature.3
2. EC and SSI
What is EC? Informally speaking, EC is the view that there are both
contexts in which it is difficult to satisfy the predicate ‘know’ and
contexts in which it is considerably easier to do so. In other words,
EC is the view that there are contexts with low standards for the
satisfaction of ‘know’ and contexts with high standards for the satis-
faction of ‘know’, the relevant epistemic standards being determined by
the practical goals, interests and presuppositions of the conversational
participants. To illustrate this view, epistemic contextualists typically
compare ‘know’ with gradable adjectives such as ‘tall’ or ‘flat’: just as
who counts as ‘tall’ in one context of ascription doesn’t necessarily do
so in another, who counts as ‘knowing p’ in one context of ascription
doesn’t necessarily do so in another. EC is thus a semantic or, as is
often said, a linguistic view, viz. the view that ‘know’ is an indexical
expression: ‘know’ may change its content with context.
To see how this conception of EC as a purely linguistic view can
be cashed out in more philosophical detail it is worthwhile taking a
brief look at David Lewis’s contextualist account of ‘knowledge’. Lewis
defines the satisfaction of ‘knows’ as follows:
(L) x satisfies ‘knows p’ in C ↔ x’s evidence eliminates all ¬p-worlds,
except for those that are properly ignored in C.4
In addition to this definition Lewis stipulates a set of rules specifying
which possibilities are properly ignored in a given context C. It is this
set of rules that is meant to determine how the content of ‘know’ is
influenced by particular conversational factors of the ascriber’s context.
Leaving aside EC for the moment, let us consider SSI, one of the key
rival theories to EC in the literature. As defined by its main advocates,
Hawthorne (2004) and Stanley (2005), SSI claims that whether a sub-
ject x knows p partly depends on the epistemic standards prevalent
in the subject’s context. Thus, if Hannah is in a context with low
epistemic standards, then Hannah’s low epistemic standards determine
3 See Hawthorne (2004) and Stanley (2005).
4 Cp. Lewis (1996). In his paper Lewis doesn’t ascend semantically and so the
impression arises that he defines knowledge rather than the satisfaction of ‘knows’
in a given context C. Since Lewis is a contextualist, however, he is clearly interested
in the latter and also makes this clear towards the end of his paper when admitting
that he should have ascended semantically, had he wanted to be formally adequate.
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whether she knows p. If, on the other hand, Hannah is in a context
with high epistemic standards, then Hannah’s high epistemic standards
determine whether she knows p, the epistemic standards of potential
third-person ascribers of ‘knowledge’ being irrelevant with regard to
the question of whether Hannah knows.
In one respect SSI is thus very much akin to more traditional episte-
mological theories: qua invariantism SSI denies that ‘know’ can change
its content with context and thus entails the negation of EC. What
distinguishes SSI from more traditional epistemologies, however, is the
claim that whether the knowledge-relation obtains in a given case
depends partly on the subject’s practical interests, goals and presup-
positions.5 It is due to this claim that SSI is primarily a metaphysical
and not a linguistic view: SSI is, after all, a view about the nature of
the knowledge-relation and is thus linguistic only insofar as it entails
the negation of EC.
To further illustrate the differences between EC and SSI it is in-
structive to fill in the philosophical details left open by the above
characterisation of SSI along similar lines as Lewis did for EC. Lewis’s
definition (L) can fairly easily be turned into an SSI-account of knowl-
edge, viz. by replacing the phrase ‘in C’ in (L), which establishes
reference to the ascriber’s context, with the phrase ‘in x’s context’,
which establishes reference to the subject’s context. Here is (L*):
(L*) x satisfies ‘knows p’ in C ↔ x’s evidence eliminates all ¬p-worlds,
except for those that are properly ignored in x’s context.
If (L*) is complemented with Lewis’s rules of proper ignoring, we attain
a prima facie functional version of SSI.6
One further question remains to be addressed at this point: which
contextual features do contextualists and subject-sensitive invariantists
take to determine epistemic standards? In other words, which con-
textual features determine that a particular world is or isn’t properly
ignored in a given context? Of course, each theorist approaches this
question in a slightly different manner, but I think it’s fair to claim that
all theorists, whether contextualists or subject-sensitive invariantists,
agree that the epistemic standards in force in a given context C are
partly determined by the practical interests of the speakers in C. The
following versions of DeRose’s famous bank case as found in Stanley
(2005) illustrate this nicely:7
5 Stanley dubs his version of SSI ‘Interest-Relative Invariantism’, but these details
are irrelevant here.
6 Note that neither Hawthorne nor Stanley explicate SSI along these lines.
7 See DeRose (1992, p. 913) and Stanley (2005, p. 3-4).
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Low Stakes:
Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday
afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home
to deposit their pay-checks. It is not important that they do
so, as they have no impending bills. But as they drive past
the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long, as
they often are on Friday afternoons. Realizing that it isn’t
very important that their paychecks are deposited right away,
Hannah says, ‘I know the bank will be open tomorrow, since
I was there just two weeks ago on Saturday morning. So we
can deposit our paychecks tomorrow morning.’
High Stakes:
Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday
afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to
deposit their pay-checks. Since they have an impending bill
coming due, and very little in their account, it is very impor-
tant that they deposit their paychecks by Saturday. Hannah
notes that she was at the bank two weeks before on a Saturday
morning, and it was open. But, as Sarah points out, banks do
change their hours. Hannah says, ‘I guess you’re right. I don’t
know that the bank will be open tomorrow.’
Our intuitions concerning Low Stakes are that Hannah speaks truly
when she self-ascribes ‘knowledge’. In High Stakes, however, our in-
tuitions are reversed: in High Stakes our intuitions are that Hannah
speaks truly when denying that she ‘knows that the bank will be open
on Saturday’ (henceforth ‘knows O’).
Now, since Hannah is both subject and ascriber in the above cases,
(L)-based EC and (L*)-based SSI can account for our intuitions along
the same lines, viz. by claiming that there are uneliminated ¬O-worlds
that Hannah can properly ignore in Low Stakes but not in High Stakes,
the relevant ¬O-worlds being ¬O-worlds in which the bank has changed
its hours recently. The reason why Hannah can properly ignore these
¬O-worlds in Low Stakes but not in High Stakes has, of course, to do
with the fact that the stakes for Hannah are low in Low Stakes but
high in High Stakes. Thus, EC and SSI agree that the stakes in a given
context C or, in other words, the speakers’ practical interests in C can
more or less directly determine the epistemic standards in force in C.8
8 Jonathan Schaffer (2006) calls into question the view that a difference in Han-
nah’s practical interests explains the difference in our intuitions in these cases.
According to Schaffer, the mentioning of the alternative possibility accounts for
this difference.
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3. Modal Embeddings
We now have the necessary background to discuss Stanley’s arguments
concerning modal and temporal embeddings. Let us firstly take a look
at the case of modal embeddings. Consider Low-Stakes again: in the
imagined situation nothing much is at stake, and since Hannah has been
at the bank on a Saturday two weeks earlier, Hannah speaks truly when
she claims ‘I know O’. Now suppose that right after uttering ‘I know
O’ Hannah adds the following counterfactual:
(1) But if I had a bill coming due, then I wouldn’t know O.9
As Stanley admits, our intuitions are here that Hannah’s assertion of
(1) expresses a falsehood: Hannah knows O, and even if she had a
bill coming due, she would still do so. SSI is thus incompatible with
our intuitions, for it entails that Hannah’s assertion of (1) expresses a
truth: according to SSI, the counterfactual situation described in the
antecedent of (1) is a high-stakes situation, such that merely having
been to the bank on a previous Saturday doesn’t suffice for Hannah to
know O. Thus, SSI entails that (1) expresses a truth, and this is surely
implausible.
Now, Stanley’s strategy concerning modal embeddings such as (1)
is simply to bite the bullet. However, Stanley attempts to play down
the problem by arguing that other epistemological theories entail the
truth of statements very similar to (1). The two candidates Stanley
mentions are reliabilism and, of course, EC. Let us firstly consider
Stanley’s remarks on reliabilism.
To show that reliabilism has implausible consequences concerning
modal embeddings, Stanley considers a version of Ginet’s fake-barn
example. As Stanley sets up the example, Bill is driving through fake-
barn country, in which there are as many fake barns around as there
are real barns. By chance, Bill is standing in front of a real barn and be-
lieves that he does. Since perception, however, is not a reliable method
of belief-formation in fake-barn country, Bill doesn’t know that he is
standing in front of a real barn. Now, imagine somebody asserts (2):
(2) “Poor Bill. He doesn’t know that is a barn. But if there were fewer
fake barns around then he would know that is a barn.”10
Stanley is clearly right in assuming that (2) as asserted in the imag-
ined situation expresses a falsehood. On the basis of this observation,
however, Stanley then goes on to argue that since “we do not take the
9 Cp. Stanley (2005, p. 106).
10 Ibid., p. 114.
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fact that reliabilism entails the truth of [(2)] to show that reliabilism
is false [. . . ], it would be excessively hasty to take counterfactuals such
as [(1)] as demonstrating the falsity of [SSI].”11
Now, the problem with this line of reasoning is, I take it, that
reliabilism doesn’t entail (2). To see this let us take a closer look at
the quantifier ‘fewer’ in (2): exactly how many fewer fake barns are
necessary for Bill to know that he is looking at a barn? Of course, this
question doesn’t have an answer or we are, at least, not in a position to
know the answer, depending on one’s favourite account of vagueness.
However, the crucial point here is that one fake barn fewer is fewer fake
barns already. Thus, (2) claims that Bill would know that he is looking
at a barn in a world in which there is only one fake barn fewer than
there actually are. This is surely false, however, for in the considered
world Bill’s belief would still be true as a matter of pure luck only, and
no sane reliabilist would want to claim the contrary. Thus, (2) is not
entailed by reliabilism.
Here is a counterfactual that is entailed by reliabilism:
(2*) Poor Bill. He doesn’t know that is a barn. But if there were no (or
almost no) fake barns around then he would know that is a barn.
I have very strong intuitions that (2*) is true. However, leaving (2*)
aside, note that Stanley hasn’t succeeded in showing that reliabilism
entails the truth of counterfactuals as implausible as (1) or (2). Let us
now turn to Stanley’s arguments for the view that EC does.
To illustrate the view that EC entails the truth of statements such as
(1) Stanley takes Lewis’s account as an example. To be precise, Stanley
claims that if we model the context-sensitivity of ‘know’ along the lines
of (L), then EC entails the truth of (3) as uttered in High-Stakes:
(3) “Hannah doesn’t know that the bank will be open on Saturday.
But if I [were to properly ignore] that she has a bill coming due,
she would know that the bank will be open on Saturday.”12
Now, the intuitive contextualist reply to this objection is that the coun-
terfactually embedded ‘know’ in (3) takes the same semantic value as
the unembedded ‘know’ in (3): both is assigned a semantic value in the
context of utterance, not in the counterfactual situation talked about
in the antecedent of (3); therefore, (3) expresses a falsehood. However,
Stanley thinks that if (L)-based EC were true, then the counterfactually
embedded occurrence of ‘know’ in (3) should take its semantic value
in the relevant counterfactual situation, and he backs up this claim by
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., p. 110.
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comparing ‘know’ to quantified noun phrases such as ‘every bottle’.
Here is Stanley’s example:
Strange Habits:
“John has the strange habit of buying exactly 70 bottles every
time he goes to a supermarket. Suppose that John visits a
supermarket that has exactly 70 bottles on the shelf, and
purchases every bottle. Someone could then truly utter the
sentence:
(4) If there were a few more bottles on the shelf, John would not have
purchased every bottle.”13
Note that ‘every bottle’ in (4) takes its semantic value in the coun-
terfactual situation in which there are more than 70 bottles on the
shelf—otherwise (4) couldn’t express a truth. Now, here is Stanley’s
point: since ‘every bottle’ in (4) takes its value in the counterfactual
situation, so should ‘know’ in (3), assuming that the semantics of ‘know’
is to be modelled along Lewis’s lines, i.e. on the basis of the context-
sensitivity of the quantified noun phrase ‘every ¬p-world that. . . ’ Thus,
according to Stanley, (3) as uttered in High-Stakes should express a
truth, and this is surely a rather unpleasant result for the Lewisian
contextualist.14
However persuasive this line of reasoning against (L)-based EC may
be, note in reply to Stanley that his argument rests on a very strong as-
sumption about the semantics of counterfactually embedded quantified
noun phrases, viz. the following principle:
(ST) Counterfactually embedded quantified noun phrases take their
semantic values in the relevant counterfactual situation described
in the antecedent of the counterfactual.
Considering Strange Habits, (ST) has some initial plausibility: clearly,
‘every bottle’ in (4) receives its semantic value in the counterfactual
situation in which there are more than 70 bottles on the shelf. However,
note that (ST) is supported by Strange Habits only, so if we can find
examples of counterfactually embedded quantified noun phrases that
are assigned semantic values in the context of utterance rather than in
the relevant counterfactual situation, then (ST)—and with it Stanley’s
argument against EC—must fail. Here are a few examples of this sort:
13 Ibid., p. 109.
14 Stanley formulates this objection differently, claiming, for instance, that ‘every’
is assigned a property that changes its extension with the circumstances of evalua-
tion, rather than a set as a simple domain. I leave aside the unnecessary technical
detail in my discussion.
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(5) If there were no philosophers, then the philosophers doing research
in the field of applied ethics would be missed most painfully by the
public.
(6) If there were no beer, everybody drinking beer on a regular basis
would be much healthier.
(7) If I suddenly were the only person alive, I would miss the Frege
scholars most.
These counterfactual conditionals are obviously felicitous and, possi-
bly, even true. However, the only sensible readings available for these
counterfactuals are readings on which the embedded quantified noun
phrases receive their semantic values in the context of utterance rather
than in the relevant counterfactual situation. Thus, (5)–(7) are rather
clear counterexamples to (ST).
Another interesting example strengthening my argument against
(ST) is the following:
(8) If John Hawthorne were a professor of biochemistry, his students
would know the difference between lactose and sucrose.
Interestingly, (8) is ambiguous between two readings: one according to
which, in the counterfactual situation, John’s counterfactual biochem-
istry students know the difference between lactose and sucrose, and
one according to which, in the counterfactual situation, John’s actual
philosophy students know that difference. Due to charity, the default
interpretation in this case is surely the former reading: there are simply
no reasons why John’s actual students should have the mentioned piece
of knowledge in the counterfactual situation. However this may be, note
that, according to (ST), there shouldn’t be any ambiguity here: (ST)
forces us to the view that the only possible interpretation of (8) is the
first one, but this is surely not the case.
Another point I would like to emphasise here is that we are usually
free to rigidify quantified noun phrases by means of the ‘actually’-
operator. The second reading of (8), for instance, can be made explicit
by disambiguating as follows:
(9) If John Hawthorne were a professor of biochemistry, his actual
students would know the difference between lactose and sucrose.
As I have mentioned already, (9) is probably false. However, the impor-
tant point here is that by means of the ‘actually’-operator quantified
noun phrases can be rigidified relative to the context of utterance.
One might thus suggest that to formally avoid Stanley’s objection, one
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could simply rigidify the quantified noun phrase ‘all ¬p-worlds that. . . ’
in (L) by means of the ‘actually’-operator. However, note that such
rigidification isn’t necessary, for my presentation of Lewis’s views in this
paper specified right from the start that ‘know’ must take its semantic
value in the context of utterance. Reconsider my earlier paraphrase of
Lewis’s analysis:
(L) x satisfies ‘knows p’ in C ↔ x’s evidence eliminates all ¬p-worlds,
except for those that are properly ignored in C.
From a contextualist point of view, the important bit in (L) is, of
course, the phrase ‘in C’. However, note that the ‘in C’ in (L) also
ensures that problems concerning modal embeddings cannot arise for
(L)-based EC: it is made explicit in the very analysis of the satisfaction
of ‘know’ that the ¬p-worlds to be eliminated in a given context of
utterance C are those that aren’t properly ignored in that given context
of utterance C.15 The semantics of ‘know’ as explicated in (L) thus
doesn’t allow for counterfactually embedded occurrences of ‘know’ to
take their semantic values in the relevant counterfactual situation. For-
mulating Lewis’s views meta-linguistically therefore precludes Stanley’s
objection right from the start, and SSI in general is, eventually, the only
epistemological theory that is troubled by modal embeddings.
4. Temporal Embeddings
Let us now turn to Stanley’s considerations about temporal embed-
dings. From the above discussion it is obvious that a similar problem
as the one concerning modal embeddings arises concerning temporal
embeddings as well: Hannah’s practical situation can, after all, not
only vary from world to world but also from time to time. To see this
in detail suppose that Hannah is, on Thursday, in a high-stakes context:
she has a bill coming due on Monday and, accordingly, doesn’t know
O on Thursday. Imagine further that one day later, on Friday, the
company to whom the bill was owed decided to alleviate the debt of all
of its customers. Then, on Friday, Hannah is in a low-stakes situation
and therefore knows O on Friday. As a consequence, SSI implausibly
entails that Hannah speaks truly if, on Saturday, she asserts:
(10) I didn’t know O on Thursday, but on Friday I did.16
15 ‘C’ is a rigid designator.
16 The example is Stanley’s. See Stanley (2005, p. 106).
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Why doesn’t (10) seem true? Obviously, it doesn’t seem true because
Hannah’s evidence, beliefs and the relations between these two were ex-
actly the same on Thursday and Friday. If these were exactly the same,
however, then what accounts for the alleged difference in Hannah’s
epistemic states contended by (10)? According to SSI, this difference is
due to a difference in Hannah’s practical interests. However, the crucial
point here is the implausibility of the view that a difference in practi-
cal interests can bring about a difference in epistemic states: we have
clear intuitions that (10) expresses a falsehood, and this suggests that
Hannah’s practical interests are, after all, epistemologically irrelevant.
How can the defender of SSI avoid this rather unpleasant consequence?
Firstly, the defender of SSI may dispute that SSI entails the truth
of the second conjunct of (10): Hannah didn’t know O on Friday. To
illustrate how one might argue for this view, note that SSI is merely
the view that the subject’s practical interests are relevant to knowl-
edge. But there is no implication that salience is not relevant: in fact,
Hawthorne (2004) expresses sympathy with the view that it is when
he claims that “[i]f S thinks that p, but a certain counterpossibility is
salient to S, then S does not know that p.”17 Therefore, even if Han-
nah’s practical interests change on Friday—if she enters a low-stakes
context on Friday—it doesn’t follow that she automatically comes to
know O on Friday. For, in remembering her recent high-stakes context,
that context may still be salient on Friday and so might infect her
Friday-context.18
But how plausible is the view that Hannah’s low-stakes Friday-
context is inevitably infected by her high-stakes Thursday-context?
Consider the following case:
Afternoon Low Stakes:
It is Friday morning, and Hannah and her wife Sarah receive
a letter informing them that a company to whom they owed
an important bill has alleviated the debt of all of its cus-
tomers. Hannah and Sarah are pleased: the sum they owed
was significant. In the afternoon, on their way home from
work, Hannah and Sarah plan to stop at the bank to deposit
their paycheques. It is not important that they do so, as they
now have no impending bills. But as they drive past the bank,
they notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are
on Friday afternoons. Realizing that it isn’t very important
that their paychecks are deposited right away, Hannah says, ‘I
17 Hawthorne (2004, p. 159) assumes that S cannot eliminate the counterpossibil-
ity at issue.
18 I am indebted to an anonymous referee of this journal for this point.
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know the bank will be open tomorrow, since I was there just
two weeks ago on Saturday morning. So we can deposit our
paycheques tomorrow morning.’
What is crucial about Afternoon Low Stakes is, of course, not only
that the stakes are low on Friday afternoon but also that, on Friday
afternoon, Hannah and Sarah pay no attention whatsoever to the possi-
bility that the bank has changed its hours recently. Thus, the possibility
that the bank has changed its hours recently is not salient on Friday
afternoon and Hannah’s low-stakes Friday-context is not infected by her
high-stakes Thursday context: Hannah speaks truly when asserting ‘I
know O’ on Friday afternoon. If Hannah knew O on Friday afternoon,
however, and didn’t know O on Thursday, because Thursday was a
high-stakes situation, then it follows that, on Saturday, Hannah speaks
truly when asserting (10).19
Let us leave behind the idea that SSI entails the falsity of the second
conjunct of (10) and consider Stanley’s remarks on the issue of temporal
embeddings. How does Stanley intend to avoid the problem generated
by (10)? Here is Stanley:
“[W]hether [SSI] entails the truth of [(10)] depends upon what
one takes to be the correct temporal metaphysics. For ex-
ample, if one thinks that there are future facts, then it is a
fact on Thursday that the company will alleviate the debt
of all of its customers. If so, then perhaps Thursday is not a
High Stakes situation for Hannah after all. Since whether [SSI]
has unintuitive consequences in the temporal case depends
upon debatable metaphysical issues, I will focus on [SSI]’s
unintuitive modal consequences in what follows.”20
Even though realism about future facts may be a debatable position in
metaphysics, let us grant Stanley that on Thursday it was a fact that
on Friday the company would alleviate the debt of all of its customers.
Now, even if we allow Stanley this debatable view it is still not clear
19 It might be objected here that, on Saturday, Hannah doesn’t know O because,
on Saturday, she remembers Thursday’s high-stakes situation and therefore attends
to the possibility that the bank has changed its hours, which then renders that
possibility salient. If Hannah doesn’t know O on Saturday, however, then she cannot
felicitously assert (10) on Saturday: (10) entails O (factivity) and Hannah therefore
violates, in asserting (10) on Saturday, the Knowledge Rule of Assertion (‘Assert p
only if you know p’; see Williamson (2000, ch. 11)). The defender of SSI might thus
aim to give a pragmatic explanation of the infelicity of Hannah’s assertion of (10)
on Saturday. Such a move, however, can be blocked rather easily, viz. by ensuring
that Hannah knows O on Saturday; for instance, by letting her assert (10) while
queuing in the bank.
20 Ibid., p. 107.
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why he thinks that it follows that Thursday was a low-stakes situation
for Hannah.
To illustrate why this doesn’t follow, consider a case in which, on
Thursday, Hannah has a firm and well-justified belief that she has a
bill coming due on Monday, while in fact the company will alleviate
her debt on Friday. Assuming realism about future facts, it is, in this
case, a fact on Thursday that Hannah doesn’t have a bill coming due
on Monday. However, since, on Thursday, Hannah has a firm and well-
justified belief that she has a bill coming due on Monday, she also has,
on Thursday, a firm and well-justified practical interest in whether the
bank will be open on Saturday. Thus, Thursday is, after all, a high-
stakes situation for Hannah and she cannot, on Thursday, properly
ignore the possibility that the bank has changed its hours.21
The crucial point underlying this line of reasoning is, of course, the
assumption that, on Thursday, Hannah’s practical interests are deter-
mined by her firm and well-justified beliefs about the future rather
than by the future itself. That there is, in the case at issue, such a close
connection between Hannah’s beliefs on the one hand and her practical
interests on the other becomes fairly obvious once we take into account
that Hannah loses her practical interest in whether the bank will be
open on Saturday in the very moment, on Friday, in which she ceases
to believe—firmly and justifiably—that she has a bill coming due on
Monday. Thus, it is a change in Hannah’s beliefs that brings about a
change in Hannah’s practical interests and thus a change of Hannah’s
context from high-stakes to low-stakes.
Of course, Stanley may deny my assumption that, on Thursday, Han-
nah’s practical interests are determined by her firm and well-justified
beliefs about the future rather than by the future itself. In fact, Stanley
seems to think that it is always actual, and not perceived, stakes that
matter to what a subject can properly ignore.22 Now, even though this
view seems, on the background of the above case, rather implausible,
it is worthwhile noting that one’s firm and well-justified beliefs about
what is at stake are in fact sometimes irrelevant with regard to one’s
practical interests: if a glass contains poison, it is not in Hannah’s
21 The rule doing the work here is Lewis’s Rule of Belief, according to which one
cannot properly ignore possibilities that one ought to believe, i.e. propositions that
one’s evidence confirms. Cp. Lewis (1996, pp. 226-7). Note that Stanley (2005, p.
92) commits himself to a similar principle, when claiming that “[a] proposition is a
serious practical question [that cannot be legitimately ignored by] an agent, if there
are alternatives to that proposition that the [agent] ought rationally to consider
in decision making.” Clearly, in the described case Hannah, on Thursday, “ought
rationally to consider in her decision making” the possibility that the bank has
changed its hours and will therefore be closed on Saturday.
22 See, for instance, Stanley (2005, p. 5).
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interest to drink from it, even if she has a firm and well-justified belief
that it contains medicine. Thus, Stanley is right to assume that one’s
practical interests are usually determined by one’s actual stakes. How-
ever, as my above example has shown, there are also exceptions to this
rule, i.e. there are also cases in which the perceived stakes—and not
the actual ones—determine one’s practical interests.23
If this is correct, however, and Hannah’s practical interests on Thurs-
day are in fact determined by her firm and well-justified beliefs about
the future, then Stanley’s argument in defence of SSI collapses: since
firm and well-justified beliefs about the future can well be false, the
(debatable) reality of future facts is irrelevant with regard to the ques-
tion of whether Hannah was in a high-stakes context on Thursday.
Thus, a realist stance towards future facts doesn’t help SSI out of
the predicament generated by (10): SSI is still forced to adopt the
implausible view that (10) expresses a truth and that is surely a cost
to the view.
Before moving on let me briefly illustrate how EC can account for
the intuition that (10) expresses a falsehood. The crucial point here
is that any particular assertion of (10) is located within a particular
context of utterance C. According to EC, the epistemic standards of
this context C determine the semantic value of both occurrences of
‘know’ in (10). Thus, the first and the second occurrence of ‘know’ in
(10) inevitably take the same semantic value.24 As a consequence, no
matter which context we consider, (10) always expresses a falsehood,
assuming that Hannah had the same evidence on Thursday and Friday.
Concerning temporal embeddings, EC has a clear advantage over SSI.
5. Conjunctive Ascriptions
Thus far we have seen that there are good reasons for the view that
SSI is the only epistemological theory on the market that is troubled
by both modal and temporal embeddings. In this section I would like
to draw attention to another type of example that causes trouble for
SSI, viz. examples that I call ‘conjunctive ascriptions’.
Suppose that John and Paul have exactly the same evidence, while
John is in a low-stakes situation towards p and Paul in a high-stakes
23 In which cases do the actual stakes determine one’s practical interests and in
which cases the perceived ones? I take it that one’s practical interests are usually
determined by whichever stakes are higher: if one’s actual stakes are higher, then
one’s actual stakes determine one’s practical interests, whereas if one’s perceived
stakes are higher, then one’s perceived stakes determine one’s practical interests.
24 No contextual change mid-sentence is triggered by the assertion of (10).
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situation towards p. Bearing in mind that SSI is the view that whether
one knows p depends on one’s practical situation, SSI entails that one
can truly assert:
(11) John and Paul have exactly the same evidence for p, but only John
has enough evidence to know p, Paul doesn’t.25
The reason why SSI entails that (11) expresses a truth in the imagined
situation is, obviously, that the evidence John and Paul have is sufficient
for ‘knowing p’ in John’s context, but not so in Paul’s. Now, I find (11)
to be a fairly unpleasant consequence of SSI. However, before drawing
conclusions from this datum, we need to consider an objection to my
contention that SSI entails the truth of (11).
To avoid problematic examples such as (11), the subject-sensitive
invariantist might be tempted to adopt Williamson’s claim that one’s
evidence consists of all and only those propositions that one knows:
E=K.26 Now, once we assume that E=K—and both Hawthorne and
Stanley seem to be attracted to this view—it follows, assuming SSI,
that not only knowledge but also evidence is infected by one’s practical
interests.27 Consequently, if E=K, then it is not at all clear that John
and Paul can have the same evidence, given that the stakes change
so radically between their respective situations. Assuming that E=K,
the subject-sensitive invariantist may thus maintain that it is by no
means clear that SSI, when paired with the view that E=K, entails the
implausible (11).
Even though this line of reasoning may seem promising initially,
I believe that it is eventually not convincing. To see this note that,
assuming SSI, John is merely in a position to know more than Paul
and thus, assuming that E=K, he is merely in a position to have more
evidence than Paul. It doesn’t follow from SSI alone, however, that
John has in fact more knowledge and thus has in fact more evidence
than Paul, and this is simply so because John may fail to believe—and
thus fail to know—all those propositions that he is in a position to
know but Paul isn’t. Assuming SSI, it is thus very well possible that
John and Paul have exactly the same knowledge and therefore also
have, assuming that E=K, exactly the same evidence, even though the
25 I take it that having enough evidence to ‘know p’ in C just means having
evidence such that one is in a position to ‘know p’ in C, rather than having evidence
such that one ‘knows p’. Thus, another way to formulate (11) would be as follows:
‘John and Paul have exactly the same evidence for p, but only John is in a position
to know p, Paul isn’t.’
26 Thanks to Jason Stanley here. For the view that E=K see Williamson (2000,
ch. 9).
27 See Stanley (2005, pp. 88-9) and Hawthorne (2004, p. 139).
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stakes differ rather radically between their respective situations. Thus,
SSI is committed to the view that there are possible cases in which
John and Paul have exactly the same evidence for p, while only John
is in a position to know p but Paul isn’t. In other words, there are,
according to SSI, cases in which (11) expresses a truth, even granting
that E=K.28
Now, as I have emphasised above, I find (11) to be a fairly un-
pleasant consequence of SSI. However, note that conjunctive ascriptions
such as (11) are not just another type of construction that turns out
problematic for SSI. To the contrary, what is really interesting about
conjunctive ascriptions is that they don’t contain temporal or modal op-
erators. Thus, concerning (11) the subject-sensitive invariantist cannot
attempt to find comfort in her temporal metaphysics or claim extenuat-
ing circumstances because modal operators behave funnily in all kinds
of situations. Concerning (11), there simply isn’t much sophisticated
explaining away to be made. Thus, examples such as (11) show with
even more clarity what the above-discussed examples containing modal
and temporal operators have shown: knowledge is insensitive to the
subject’s practical situation.29
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